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TO INCLUDE OR TO NOT INCLUDE: EXAMINING WHEN 
ATTORNEYS’ FEES MAY BE AWARDED UNDER § 362(K)(1) 
ABSTRACT 
Although courts are reluctant to shift attorneys’ fees in legal matters, 
Congress has made special exceptions to protect individuals in unique 
positions or to discourage certain undesirable behavior. With § 362(k)(1), 
Congress made an express exception to allow debtors to recover attorneys’ fees 
after a creditor willfully violates the automatic stay. For nearly twenty-five 
years, courts have interpreted § 362(k)(1) to allow debtors to recover 
attorneys’ fees incurred by seeking damages against the automatic stay 
violator. However, in Sternberg v. Johnston, the Ninth Circuit created a split in 
authority when it refused to allow a debtor to recover the full extent of his 
attorneys’ fees under § 362(k)(1). In a rather unusual reading of § 362(k)(1), 
the Ninth Circuit denied the debtor the full extent of his attorneys’ fees because 
it held that the text of § 322(k)(1) did not clearly allow for such fee shifting. 
This Comment argues against the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 
§ 362(k)(1). First, this Comment under takes a statutory analysis of 
§ 362(k)(1). In doing so, it becomes clear that both a textualist and a 
purposivist approach support reading § 362(k)(1) as a full fee-shifting statute. 
Second, this Comment offers policy reasons in favor of reading § 362(k)(1) as 
a full fee-shifting statute. Given the tenuous financial position of debtors 
facing bankruptcy, courts should interpret § 362(k)(1) in a manner that places 
debtors back into their prior financial positions before the creditor willfully 
violated the automatic stay. Third, this Comment offers practical solutions, 
including possible amendments that could add clarity to the matter. 
INTRODUCTION 
The automatic stay is a fundamental part of the bankruptcy process. The 
automatic stay requires that creditors discontinue virtually all collection actions 
against a debtor once a debtor files a bankruptcy petition.1 The automatic stay 
 
 1 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006); see also Ann K. Wooster, What Constitutes “Willful Violation” of 
Automatic Stay Provisions of Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.A. §362(k)) Sufficient to Award Damages—Chapter 
7 Cases, 23 A.L.R. FED. 2d 339, § 2 (2007).  
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places a hold on prepetition litigation, foreclosure actions, wage garnishments, 
repossession efforts by creditors, collection calls from creditors, and other 
similar actions.2 Although there are some exceptions to the automatic stay,3 the 
stay is a powerful tool that Congress created to generate a “breathing spell” for 
a debtor entering bankruptcy.4 
Due to the strong policy grounds for the automatic stay, Congress wanted 
to make sure that courts protect debtors against creditors who willfully violate 
the automatic stay.5 As such, Congress passed § 362(k)(1), which allows a 
debtor to recover damages, including attorneys’ fees, from a creditor who 
willfully violates the automatic stay.6 In its entirety, § 362(k)(1) provides the 
following: “an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by 
this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, 
and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”7 
Currently, there is a circuit split regarding the extent of attorneys’ fees that 
are recoverable under § 362(k)(1).8 In 2008, the Fifth Circuit interpreted 
§ 362(k)(1) as a full fee-shifting statute.9 Then, in 2010, the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of § 362(k)(1).10 The Ninth 
Circuit, in Sternberg v. Johnston, took a surprisingly narrow reading of actual 
damages11 and held that § 362(k)(1) only allows a debtor to recover attorneys’ 
 
 2 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); Superior Propane v. Zartun (In re Zartun), 30 B.R. 543, 545 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983) 
(repossession); Henderson v. Auto Barn Atlanta, Inc. (In re Henderson), No. 09-50596, 2011 WL 1838777, at 
*5 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. May 13, 2011) (phone calls); see, e.g., Henkel v. Frese, Hansen, Anderson, Hueston, & 
Whitehead, P.A. (In re Newgent Golf, Inc.), 402 B.R. 424, 433 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (wage garnishments); 
In re Markey, 144 B.R. 738, 746 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (foreclosures). 
 3 Section 362(b) provides several exceptions to the automatic stay. One example is that a debtor’s 
domestic support obligations are exempt from the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(iii).  
 4 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296; see also Cavanaugh 
v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. (In re Cavanaugh), 271 B.R. 414, 424 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (“[T]he 
automatic stay is the single most important protection afforded to debtors by the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 5 Joslyn v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Joslyn), 75 B.R. 590, 593 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987) (noting that 
the point of § 362(k)(1) is to “discourage violations of the automatic stay by appropriate sanctions”). 
 6 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).  
 7 Id. 
 8 Sternberg v. Johnston, 595 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 189 (2010) (“We 
recognize that the Fifth Circuit appears to have held to the contrary . . . . [w]e do not create a circuit split 
lightly.”).  
 9 Young v. Repine (In re Repine), 536 F.3d 512, 522 (5th Cir. 2008).  
 10 Sternberg, 595 F.3d at 948.  
 11 The Sternberg court noted that a debtor’s actual damages stop when the creditor’s violation of the 
automatic stay ends. Because 362(k)(1) only allows a debtor to collect attorney’s fees as actual damages, the 
court reasoned that § 362(k)(1) only allows for the recovery of attorney’s fees incurred to bring an end to the 
stay violation. Id. 
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fees that were incurred to stop a creditor’s violation of the automatic stay.12 
Under the Ninth Circuit’s reading of § 362(k)(1), the statute does not allow a 
debtor to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in the damages proceeding.13 The 
Ninth Circuit noted that courts must read all legislation within the backdrop of 
the American Rule, which requires each party to pay his or her own attorneys’ 
fees, win or lose.14 Therefore, the Sternberg court held that because the text of 
§ 362(k)(1) does not explicitly allow a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees for the 
damages proceeding, a debtor can only recover attorneys’ fees incurred to 
bring an end to the stay violation.15 
To better understand the divergent interpretations, it is important to 
comprehend a debtor’s road to recovery after a creditor willfully violates the 
automatic stay. A debtor normally incurs attorneys’ fees in two distinct 
circumstances: 1) the debtor incurs attorneys’ fees to “fix” the consequences 
that the creditor’s stay violation created; and 2) the debtor incurs attorneys’ 
fees by pursuing a subsequent proceeding to recover damages from the creditor 
under § 362(k)(1).16 As such, the question becomes whether § 362(k)(1) allows 
a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees under both circumstances: fixing the stay 
violation, and prosecuting the stay violator for damages. 
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical. Susan files for chapter 7 
on March 1, 2010, because she desperately wants a fresh start from her debt 
and a break from her harassing creditors. Prior to declaring bankruptcy, Susan 
owed $100,000 in medical bills for an emergency operation. Although Susan 
informed the hospital about her bankruptcy filing, the hospital decided to 
garnish Susan’s income on March 7, 2010, which is a clear violation of the 
automatic stay.17 Susan’s lawyer steps in and alerts the hospital that its actions 
are in violation of the automatic stay. Susan’s lawyer provided the hospital 
with documentation evincing Susan’s current bankruptcy and made phone calls 
 
 12 Id.  
 13 Id.  
 14 Id. at 945–46 (explaining that “[u]nlike Britain where counsel fees are regularly awarded to the 
prevailing party, it is the general rule in this country that unless Congress provides otherwise, parties are to 
bear their own attorney’s fees”) (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994)).  
 15 Sternberg, 595 F.3d at 948. 
 
16
 Grine v. Chambers (In re Grine), 439 B.R. 461, 469 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (noting that the 
questions before the Court were whether §362(k)(1) allows a debtor to (1) recover attorneys’ fees incurred 
before the adversary complaint was filed to stop the automatic stay and (2) for attorneys’ fees incurred after 
the adversary proceeding is filed).  
 17 See Myers v. Miracle Fin., Inc. (In re Myers), 402 B.R. 370, 372 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2009) (holding 
that the creditor violated the automatic stay by garnishing the debtor’s income after having notice of the 
debtor’s bankruptcy petition).  
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to ensure their compliance with the automatic stay. Accordingly, the hospital 
reluctantly ordered the wage garnishment to cease. The process of stopping the 
hospital’s violation of the automatic stay resulted in four hours of Susan’s 
attorney’s time, which amounted to $1,000 in attorneys’ fees. 
On March 14, 2010, after the wage garnishment ceased, Susan initiated an 
adversary proceeding against the hospital to recover damages due to the 
hospital’s violation of the automatic stay under § 362(k)(1).18 The hospital’s 
legal team refused to concede that its actions were willful. Thus, after Susan’s 
attorney expended hours conducting research, exchanging briefs, attending 
hearings, and preparing for hearings, Susan had incurred $8,00019 in attorneys’ 
fees by September 1, 2010, for the separate damages proceeding. Now, the 
question becomes the following: to what extent can Susan recover attorneys’ 
fees under § 362(k)(1)? Can she only recover the amount necessary to stop the 
hospital’s violation of the automatic stay, or can she also collect the amount 
incurred to recover damages in the adversary proceeding? The answer to this 
question is the crux of the split in authority between the Ninth and Fifth 
Circuits. 
Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sternberg, bankruptcy courts were 
in overwhelming agreement that § 362(k)(1) completely circumvented the 
American Rule, which requires parties to pay their own litigation fees.20 Thus, 
prior to Sternberg, most courts would have allowed Susan to recover attorneys’ 
fees incurred to fix the stay violation and attorneys’ fees incurred in the 
subsequent damages action. Under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, however, 
courts would only allow Susan to recover the $1,000 in attorneys’ fees incurred 
to stop the stay violation. Susan, who is currently in chapter 7 bankruptcy, 
would have to come up with $8,000 in attorneys’ fees that she incurred to 
recover her damages from the hospital’s unlawful wage garnishment. 
Given the circuit split regarding the recovery of attorneys’ fees under 
§ 362(k)(1), there is a need to reevaluate the statute and examine the text, the 
 
 18 Courts have held that the appropriate way for a debtor to recover damages for an automatic stay 
violation is for the debtor to initiate an adversary proceeding under Rule 7001. See, e.g., Irby v. Mr. Money 
Fin. Co. (In re Irby), 321 B.R. 468, 470–71 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005); In re Rimsat, Ltd., 208 B.R. 910, 913 
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1997). 
 19 The debtor’s attorneys’ fees can reach $8,000 if the attorney expends roughly thirty hours of time at a 
standard rate of $250. For example in In re Ventura Linenko the debtor’s attorney spent twenty-seven hours on 
issues pertaining to the damages proceeding at a rate of $350. See Page Ventures, LLC v. Ventura-Linenko (In 
re Ventura-Linenko), No. 3:10-CV-138-RCJ-RAM, 2011 WL 1304464, at *4 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 2011). 
 20 See In re Grine, 439 B.R. at 470 (noting that prior to 2005, there was substantial judicial agreement 
allowing a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees for both remedying and prosecuting a claim). 
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purpose, and the policy goals of § 362(k)(1). As such, this Comment argues 
that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly interpreted § 362(k)(1). Because the 
attorneys’ fees dispute centers around a statute, this Comment provides a 
statutory interpretation analysis of § 362(k)(1). A textualist and a purposivist 
approach both support reading § 362(k)(1) to allow a debtor to recover the full 
extent of his or her attorneys’ fees after a creditor willfully violates the 
automatic stay. In addition, there are important policy reasons why courts 
should interpret § 362(k)(1) as a full fee-shifting statute. Given the unfavorable 
financial position of the debtor, courts should interpret § 362(k)(1) as a 
departure from the American Rule in order to place the debtor back in the same 
financial position he would have been in but for the creditor’s willful stay 
violation. 
This Comment provides a comprehensive analysis on the current 
controversy surrounding §362(k)(1). Part I details the background and history 
of §362(k)(1) and the automatic stay. Part II offers a statuary analysis of 
§362(k)(1), comparing a textualist approach with a purposivist approach. Part 
III provides compelling policy reasons why debtors are in an unfavorable 
financial situation when it comes to paying to recover damages from a 
creditor’s willful automatic stay violation. Finally, this Comment proposes 
practical solutions, including possible congressional amendments to resolve 
any ambiguities with the statute. 
I. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY AND 
§ 362(K)(1) 
A. The Automatic Stay 
To understand § 362(k)(1), it is important to appreciate the significance of 
the automatic stay. The automatic stay is a fundamental part of the bankruptcy 
process.21 Section 362 of the Code outlines the rules and regulations regarding 
the automatic stay.22 The automatic stay requires that creditors discontinue 
virtually all collection actions against the debtor after a debtor files a 
bankruptcy petition.23 Additionally, the stay automatically starts with the 
 
 21 Diamond v. Premier Capital, Inc. (In re Diamond), 346 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Jamo v. 
Katahdin Fed. Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 392, 398 (1st Cir. 2002)).  
 22 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).  
 23 See id.; see also Wooster, supra note 1, § 2.  
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debtor’s bankruptcy petition, and no formal action by the debtor is required to 
trigger it.24 
The automatic stay is a powerful tool that Congress created to benefit both 
the debtor and creditors during the bankruptcy process.25 For the debtor, the 
automatic stay aligns well with the “fresh start” policy goals of bankruptcy. 
Congress created the automatic stay to provide debtors with breathing space 
and a break from the harassing and stressful solicitations from creditors.26 By 
granting the debtor a period of freedom from the pressures of creditors, the 
debtor can focus on satisfying debts, rehabilitation, and moving forward. 
Moreover, the stay also benefits creditors. The stay places the debtor’s 
creditors on common ground because the stay prevents one creditor from 
gaining leverage at the expense of other creditors.27 By preventing a chaotic 
race to the courthouse among creditors, the stay allows the court to distribute a 
debtor’s assets in an organized and systematic manner.28 
B. A Debtor’s Right to Recover Damages If a Creditor Violates the Automatic 
Stay 
If a creditor violates the automatic stay, a debtor has two ways to recover 
damages: 1) the debtor can recover damages because the creditor is in 
contempt of court; or 2) the debtor can recover damages under § 362(k)(1) for 
a willful stay violation.29 
1. Collecting Damages for a Stay Violation Under Contempt of Court 
Sanctions 
Prior to § 362(k)(1), contempt of court sanctions were a debtor’s only 
recourse against stay violators.30 Currently, some courts still impose contempt 
sanctions against a creditor who violates the automatic stay.31 These courts 
reason that the automatic stay has the weight of a court order, so a violation is 
 
 24 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.12 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011).  
 25 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
 26 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97.  
 27 COLLIER supra note 24, ¶ 362.03.  
 28 See SEC v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2000).  
 29 COLLIER supra note 24, ¶ 362.12.  
 30 United States v. Harchar, 331 B.R. 720, 729 (N.D. Ohio 2005). 
 31 See, e.g., Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1553 (11th Cir. 1996); 
Mountain Am. Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444, 448 (10th Cir. 1990).  
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equivalent to contempt of court.32 These courts award contempt of court 
sanctions against creditors based on the court’s power under § 105(a) to “issue 
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
provisions of this title.”33 Notably, courts allow a debtor to recover attorneys’ 
fees after holding a creditor in contempt for violating the stay.34 
Since the passage of § 362(k)(1), it has become less common to award 
damages based on the contempt of court rationale because of the higher burden 
of proof imposed on a debtor.35 The contempt of court standard allows a 
creditor to escape sanctions if the creditor acted without maliciousness and had 
a good faith belief that its actions did not violate the stay.36 On the other hand, 
§ 362(k)(1) is construed strictly against the alleged stay violator.37 
Nevertheless, strategic debtors can still use contempt of court sanctions to 
circumvent the Ninth Circuit’s limitation on awarding attorneys’ fees.38 In 
Sternberg, the court noted that its holding did not apply to a civil contempt of 
court action.39 Thus, despite Sternberg, a debtor in the Ninth Circuit may still 
petition to recover his or her full amount of attorneys’ fees in a contempt of 
court action. 
2. Collecting Damages for a Willful Stay Violation Under § 362(k)(1) 
In 1984, Congress added § 362(k)(1) as an amendment to the Code.40 
Section 362(k)(1) allows a debtor to recover actual damages, including 
attorneys’ fees, for a creditor’s willful violation of the automatic stay. Section 
 
 32 In re Jove Eng’g, 92 F.3d at 1553 (“[Section] 105 creates a statutory contempt power in bankruptcy 
proceedings, distinct from the court’s inherent contempt powers . . . .”); COLLIER, supra note 24, ¶ 362.12[2].  
 33 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)(1) (2006).  
 34 See In re Skinner, 917 F.2d at 448. In In re Skinner, the Tenth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court’s 
contempt of court sanctions against a creditor that violated the automatic stay. The court held that § 105(a) 
allows bankruptcy courts to impose civil contempt sanctions against creditors that violate the automatic stay. 
Id. (noting its approach coincides with the Fourth Circuit’s).  
 35 See Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 902 F.2d 
1098, 1104 (2d Cir. 1990) (adopting a standard less stringent than the bad faith standard for a civil contempt of 
court action).  
 36 Id. at 1104.  
 37 See COLLIER, supra note 24, ¶ 362.12[3].  
 38 See In re Wallace, No. BAP NV-11-1681-KIPAD, 2012 WL 2401871, at *5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 26, 
2012) (affirming an award of attorneys’ fees to the debtor after the creditor violated the debtor’s discharge of 
debt injunction). It is important to note that In re Wallace does not deal with §362(k)(1). 
 39 Sternberg v. Johnston, 595 F.3d 937, 946 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 40 David Swarthout, Note, When Is an Individual a Corporation? When The Court Misinterprets a 
Statute, That’s When!, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 151, 157 (2000). 
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362(k)(1) provides bankruptcy courts with a distinct statutory basis to sanction 
automatic stay violators.41 As such, courts no longer have to rely solely on the 
contempt of court rationale to sanction creditors who violate the automatic 
stay. Specifically, § 362(k) provides the following: 
(1) [A]n individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided 
by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and 
attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover 
punitive damages. 
(2) If such violation is based on an action taken by an entity in the 
good faith belief that subsection (h) applies to the debtor, the 
recovery under paragraph (1) of this subsection against such entity 
shall be limited to actual damages.42 
Congress added § 362(k)(1) as part of the Federal Bankruptcy Amendments 
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAFJA).43 The provision pertaining to 
§ 362(k)(1) has been referred to as part of the Consumer Credit Amendments 
of 1984.44 Congress added the section as part of a package of amendments 
dealing with consumer bankruptcy.45 From 1984 to 2005, the subsection was 
identified as § 362(h).46 Subsequently, with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), the section was re-
designated as § 362(k)(1).47 Notably, after the BAPCPA of 2005, the wording 
of the subsection remained virtually the same.48 
Under § 362(k)(1), it is mandatory that courts award actual damages and 
attorneys’ fees if a creditor willfully violates the automatic stay.49 The court 
has discretion, however, in awarding punitive damages for a creditor’s 
violation of the stay. Most jurisdictions hold that a creditor willfully violates 
 
 41 Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 902 F.2d 1098, 
1104 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 42 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006) 
 43 Swarthout, supra note 40, at 157.  
 44 Id. at 159. 
 45 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 352; 
COLLIER, supra note 24, ¶ 362.12[2].  
 46 Wooster, supra note 1, § 2. This Comment will only refer to 362(k)(1), even for situations prior to 
2005 where the section was designated as § 362(h).  
 47 Id. 
 48 In whole, the pre-BAPCPA § 362(h) provided the following: “An individual injured by any willful 
violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, 
and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C. 362(h) (2002).  
 49 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). The award of damages is mandatory because the text uses the phrase “shall 
recover.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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the stay if the creditor (1) had knowledge of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition, 
and (2) intended to perform the act.50 Specific intent that the creditor’s actions 
would violate the stay is not required.51 Also, the debtor does not have to prove 
that the creditor acted in bad faith or with malice.52 
C. Sternberg and In re Grine: Understanding Two Polarizing Cases 
Sternberg and In re Grine are two of the most recent decisions that provide 
a lengthy analysis on the attorneys’ fee issue of § 362(k)(1).53 In 2008, the 
Fifth Circuit decided on the attorneys’ fee issue in In re Repine.54 The Fifth 
Circuit awarded the debtor the full extent of his attorneys’ fees, but it failed to 
provide substantive analysis on the issue in its holding.55 Unpersuaded by 
Repine, the Ninth Circuit created a circuit split in Sternberg, holding that a 
debtor’s recoverable attorneys’ fees are limited to work performed prior to the 
damages proceeding.56 A year later, in In re Grine, the Northern District 
Bankruptcy Court of Ohio provided a holding that criticized Sternberg’s 
rationale.57 
1. The Sternberg Case 
In Sternberg v. Johnston, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals created a 
circuit split when it departed from other circuits by holding that § 362(k)(1) 
only allows a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees incurred for fixing a creditor’s 
automatic stay violation and not for the subsequent damages action.58 In 
 
 50 Wooster, supra note 1, § 2.  
 51 Id.  
 52 COLLIER, supra note 24, ¶ 362.12.  
 53 See Sternberg v. Johnston, 595 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2010); Grine v. Chambers (In re Grine), 439 B.R. 
461, 464 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010).  
 54 Young v. Repine (In re Repine), 536 F.3d 512, 512 (5th Cir. 2008).  
 55 See id. at 522. The court’s analysis on the attorneys’ fees issue: 
We have yet to consider a challenge to the propriety of a fee award under section 362(k). The 
lower courts in our Circuit have concluded that it is proper to award attorney’s fees that were 
incurred prosecuting a section 362(k) claim. We adopt the same reading of section 362(k) and 
therefore agree. Accordingly, we reject Young’s claims that the statute does not provide for a 
successful claimant to collect the fees incurred in prosecuting their action. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 56 Sternberg, 595 F.3d at 948. The court noted, “[w]e do not create a circuit split lightly. But the above-
quoted language is all the court said on the issue. Without more, we are hard-pressed to find this decision 
persuasive.” Id.  
 57 In re Grine, 439 B.R. at 470–71.  
 58 Sternberg, 595 F.3d at 948.  
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Sternberg, the debtor’s ex-wife sought a contempt order against the debtor for 
failure to pay spousal support.59 The debtor’s ex-wife filed the contempt order 
in January 2001 in state court.60 Four months later, on May 14, 2001, the 
debtor filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.61 During a hearing on May 17, 
2001, the debtor notified the state court of his bankruptcy petition, and he 
claimed his filing stayed any action related to the property settlement, 
attorneys’ fees, and sanctions portions of the contempt order.62 The state court, 
however, decided to proceed on the issue of contempt and ordered the debtor 
pay a judgment of $87,525.60.63 The state court required the debtor to pay the 
sum by August 1, 2001, or be jailed.64 
Because the debtor’s ex-wife was seeking a judgment after the debtor filed 
his bankruptcy petition, the debtor wrote his ex-wife’s lawyer a letter stating 
that their actions violated the automatic stay.65 The debtor asked his ex-wife’s 
lawyer to take appropriate measures to cure the violation, but the lawyer 
refused.66 After exhausting all efforts to remedy the stay violation, the debtor 
filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against his ex-wife and her 
lawyer for a willful violation of the stay.67 After numerous motions, hearings, 
and a trial, the bankruptcy court held that the ex-wife’s lawyer did violate the 
automatic stay because he had a duty to remedy the state court’s stay 
violation.68 The bankruptcy court awarded the debtor $2,883.20 for his missed 
work, $20,000 for emotional distress, and $69,986 in costs and attorneys’ fees, 
which included attorneys’ fees incurred for prosecuting the adversary 
proceeding.69 
After the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court, the Ninth Circuit held 
as a matter of first impression, that § 362(k)(1) only allows the debtor to 
 
 59 Id. at 940.  
 60 Id. 
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. at 941.  
 63 Id.  
 64 Id.  
 65 Id.  
 66 Id. Following the debtor’s petition to the Arizona Court of Appeals, the opposing lawyer filed a 
responsive brief arguing that his actions did not violate the automatic stay because of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(b)(2)(A)–(B). Id.  
 67 Id. Notably, Parker settled with Johnston prior to the court’s holding, leaving only Parker’s lawyer as a 
defendant. Id. at 942.  
 68 Id. (holding that the state court violated the stay because it failed to properly distinguish between 
arrearages from the debtor’s estate versus arrearages from non-estate property).  
 69 Id.  
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recover attorneys’ fees incurred to fix the stay violation, and § 362(k)(1) did 
not allow the debtor to recover attorneys’ fees incurred to seek damages.70 
First, the court noted that courts must read every statute within the backdrop of 
the American Rule, which requires each party to pay his or her own attorneys’ 
fees.71 Second, the court noted that the term “actual damages” is ambiguous, 
and needed to be defined.72 The court noted that under the dictionary 
definition, actual damages are only meant to compensate for a proven injury or 
an actual loss.73 Accordingly, the court reasoned that after the stay violation 
ends, the debtor’s actual losses also end.74 Thus, the court stated that attorneys’ 
fees incurred after the stay violation is fixed are not recoverable as actual 
damages.75 In its rationale, the court considered tort principles that do not 
permit a party to recover attorneys’ fees, even if the party is not made whole as 
a result.76 
Third, the court noted that a contrary reading would not further the 
financial or non-financial goals of the automatic stay.77 The court noted that 
the financial goal of the stay is to give a debtor time to reorganize, not to aid 
debtors in suing creditors.78 As for the non-financial goals, the court argued 
that the stay creates a “breathing spell” where the debtor is free from 
litigation.79 Thus, the court stated that allowing a debtor to recover attorneys’ 
fees in the damages action would encourage litigation, contravening the goals 
of the stay.80 
2. Examining the Case of In Re Grine 
With regard to the attorneys’ fees debate, Grine v. Chambers (In re Grine) 
represents the other extreme. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio decided In re Grine in the same year as Sternberg. 
 
 70 Id. at 946–48.  
 71 Id. at 946–47 (“[I]t is the general rule in this country that unless Congress provides otherwise, parties 
are to bear their own attorney’s fees.” (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994))).  
 72 Id. at 947. The court reasoned that actual damages was an ambiguous phrase, given its context, 
because the statute does not define actual damages. Id.  
 73 Id.  
 74 Id.  
 75 Id. 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id. at 947–48.  
 78 Id. at 948. 
 79 Id.  
 80 Id.  
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The Grine court addressed the attorneys’ fees issue head on, and it blatantly 
denounced the Sternberg holding.81 
In In re Grine, the debtor filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.82 After the 
debtor filed for bankruptcy, one of his creditors, an optometrist, sent the debtor 
a billing statement for prepetition debts.83 In response, the debtor’s attorney 
sent the creditor a letter informing him that his actions violated the automatic 
stay.84 Additionally, the debtor’s attorney proposed that the creditor settle the 
dispute for $200, which would pay for the amount of time the attorney spent 
trying to remedy the stay violation.85 The creditor, however, rejected the 
settlement offer.86 Instead, the creditor sent the debtor’s attorney a check with 
the words “extortion money” written on it.87 In response, the debtor and his 
attorney filed an adversary proceeding against the creditor.88 The debtor’s wife 
testified that her damages included twelve hours of lost wages for trial 
preparation, five dollars in gas for visits to her lawyer’s office, and attorneys’ 
fees for the current damages proceeding.89 The court held that the debtor was 
only entitled to five dollars in compensatory damages.90 Next, the court had to 
decide whether to award the debtor attorneys’ fees for both remedying and 
prosecuting the stay violation. 
The court noted the circuit split and deliberately rejected the Sternberg 
decision.91 The court noted that prior to the 2005 BAPCPA, most courts held 
that § 362(k)(1) allowed a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees for remedying and 
prosecuting a stay violation.92 Further, the court held that a debtor is entitled to 
recover attorneys’ fees as long as the litigation was necessary to provide the 
 
 81 Grine v. Chambers (In re Grine), 439 B.R. 461 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010). 
 82 Id. at 465.  
 83 Id. Notably, the debtor notified the defendant of his bankruptcy petition prior to receiving the billing 
statement. Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 464. 
 86 Id. at 465.  
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 465–66. 
 89 Id. at 466. 
 90 Id. at 469. 
 91 Id. at 470. “[T]his court disagrees with the holding and the unpersuasive reasoning in Sternberg. The 
Ninth Circuit dubiously found that the straightforward language of § 362(k) is ambiguous . . . . This court does 
not find the language of the statute ambiguous or in need of odd parsing of simple language . . . .”).  
 92 Id. 
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debtor with a complete remedy.93 Thus, although the debtor only incurred five 
dollars in compensatory damages, the court allowed the debtor to recover $560 
in attorneys’ fees because the stay violation proximately caused the litigation.94 
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF § 362(K)(1): TEXTUALISM VERSUS 
PURPOSIVISM 
Statutory interpretation describes the different methods, techniques, and 
cannons that courts use when determining the meaning of a particular statute. 
Textualism and purposivism are the two main approaches that courts use when 
interpreting a statute.95 In the case of § 362(k)(1), both a textualist and a 
purposivist approach would allow a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees incurred 
during a damages proceeding. 
A. The Textualist Approach 
Textualism is a theory of statutory interpretation that focuses on the text of 
a statute. The textualism approach is often associated with Supreme Court 
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, as well as Judge Frank 
Easterbrook.96 Under a textualist approach, the text of the statute is the only 
relevant consideration, and outside sources of legislative history and legislative 
intent are usually rejected.97 
Textualism proponents insist it is the true objective approach because of 
constitutional principles.98 Textualists point to the fact that only the text of a 
statute is the law, not legislative reports or floor debates.99 Moreover, because 
of the large amount of disagreement in Congress, a statute’s legislative history 
is often imprecise and disoriented.100 Textualists argue that the legislative 
process requires compromise, and the text of the statute is the final result of 
 
 93 Id. at 471–72. Section 362(k)(1) does not specify a reasonableness standard, but most courts apply a 
reasonableness analysis. Id. at 472 (quoting Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. Roman, (In re Roman), 283 B.R. 1, 9–10 
(9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002)). 
 94 Id. at 475.  
 95 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and 
the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1761–62 (2010).  
 96 John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005); Caleb Nelson, 
What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 347 (2005). 
 97 Gluck, supra note 95, at 1762–63.  
 98 Id. at 1763. 
 99 See id.  
 100 Manning, supra note 96, at 419; Nelson, supra note 96, at 368–69.  
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this legislative compromise.101 Thus, courts should only examine a statute’s 
text for interpretation. 
A textualist approach considers the statute’s grammar, sentence structure, 
ordinary definitions, and the textual structure of other related statutes. In this 
Comment, the following elements of textualism are explored: 1) the plain 
meaning rule, which requires a court to follow the plain meaning of a statute 
that is unambiguous; 2) textual comparisons of similar statutes to gain context 
on how Congress uses language; and 3) textual canons of construction. 
1. The Plain Meaning of § 362(k)(1) 
The first step of statutory interpretation in a textualist approach is to 
examine the plain meaning of the statute.102 Under the plain meaning rule, 
courts cannot go beyond the text of a statute if the text is unambiguous.103 
Plain meaning analysis is very narrow because it is limited to the four corners 
of the statute.104 Also, the plain meaning approach is controversial because 
determining whether a statute is ambiguous is subjective.105 However, there are 
two exceptions to the plain meaning rule. A court will not apply the plain 
meaning rule if 1) the plain meaning produces an absurd result, or if 2) the 
plain meaning conflicts with clear expressions of legislative intent.106 
From an initial reading of § 362(k)(1) it appears quite clear that a debtor 
can recover attorneys’ fees for a damages action. The text of the statute 
specifically provides that an individual can recover “costs and attorneys’ 
fees.”107 Therefore, under the plain meaning rule, a strong argument can be 
made that § 362(k)(1) is unambiguous, and the statutory interpretation should 
stop here. As the court in In re Grine poignantly noted, “[t]his court does not 
find the language of the statute ambiguous or in need of odd parsing of simple 
language or resort to a dictionary or the guidance of Tennessee, California or 
Colorado state common law.”108 
 
 101 Manning, supra note 96, at 419; Nelson, supra note 96, at 370–71. 
 102 Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004).  
 103 Id. (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)).  
 104 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 79 (2006).  
 105 Hon. Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A 
Judicial Perspective after Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 213 (2007) (“Bankruptcy courts 
should no longer feel compelled to engage in the fiction of finding plain meaning.”).  
 106 RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 2004).  
 107 11 U.S.C. §362(k)(1) (2006).  
 108 Grine v. Chambers (In re Grine), 439 B.R. 461, 470 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010).  
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However, after reading § 362(k)(1) closely, one can recognize that 
ambiguity arguably exists in the inartful syntax of the statute. Although the 
statute allows an individual to recover costs and attorneys’ fees, it authorizes 
the recovery of such costs and fees only when they are a part of the debtor’s 
actual damages.109 In pertinent part, § 362(k)(1) provides that an individual 
“shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees.”110 
Congress placed this insert “including costs and attorneys’ fees” right after 
“actual damages,” which shows that Congress only wanted a debtor to recover 
attorneys’ fees as part of the debtor’s actual damages. Thus, it is important to 
ascertain the meaning of actual damages, in order to determine whether a 
debtor’s actual damages includes attorneys’ fees incurred in the damages 
proceeding. 
Notably, Congress does not define “actual damages” within the statute.111 
However, Black’s Law Dictionary defines actual damages as follows: “[a]n 
amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven injury or loss; 
damages that repay actual losses.”112 Thus, the awarding of attorneys’ fees 
incurred in a damages proceeding depends on whether the court takes a broad 
or narrow reading of “actual damages.” 
The Sternberg court took a narrow reading of actual damages, and reasoned 
that a debtor’s actual damages stop accruing when the stay violation stops.113 
Consequently, the court held that a debtor’s attorneys’ fees must be limited to 
fees incurred until the stay violation ends.114 Under its narrow interpretation of 
actual damages, a debtor’s decision to pursue a subsequent damages action is 
not part of his actual damages.115 The different interpretations of the same 
statute by the Sternberg and Grine courts illustrates that the statute is 
somewhat ambiguous, and it shows the subjectivity of the plain meaning 
rule.116 Although the plain meaning rule seems simple and straightforward, its 
application can lead to different results depending on what a person perceives 
as “plain.” The Honorable Thomas F. Waldron and Neil M. Berman expressed 
 
 109 11 U.S.C. §362(k)(1).  
 110 Id.  
 111 See Sternberg v. Johnston, 595 F.3d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 112 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (9th ed. 2009). 
 113 Sternberg, 595 F.3d at 947–48.  
 114 Id. at 948.  
 115 Id. at 947.  
 116 See Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Dawson), 390 F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Harchar, (In re Harchar), 331 B.R. 720, 726 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (noting the ambiguity of the term actual 
damages).  
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such criticism of the plain meaning approach in their article Principled 
Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective After Two Years 
of BAPCPA: 
Bankruptcy courts should no longer feel compelled to engage in the 
fiction of finding plain meaning. Of course it makes sense to start any 
exercise in statutory interpretation by reading the statute closely. 
Judges should consider the operative language, the language of other 
provisions, and structural cues in the statute. But then it is equally 
appropriate to pan back from the statute itself to its context, including 
legislative history, prior law and practice, and policy considerations, 
to make an interpretation of the intended meaning. Otherwise, courts 
are likely to err and to bring on unintended consequences.117 
Thus, it is important to consider the full range of statutory interpretation 
approaches. 
2. Comparing the Text of 362(k)(1) to Similar Bankruptcy Statutes 
Modern textualists have expanded the tools and techniques available in 
statutory interpretation beyond the plain meaning approach. Unlike the plain 
meaning approach, which confines statutory interpretation to the “four 
corners” of the statute in question, modern textualists also look beyond the 
words to find the statute’s meaning.118 Modern textualists still reject non-
statutory documents expressing legislative intent, but they do utilize outside 
principles and canons to provide context.119 One technique that textualists use 
to ascertain legislative intent is a comparison approach. In a comparison 
approach, a court will compare the text of an ambiguous statute with the text of 
similar statutes. In this process, the court tries to ascertain how Congress 
communicates its messages through text. 
 
 117 Waldron & Berman, supra note 105, at 213.  
 118 Manning, supra note 104, at 79.  
In contrast with their ancestors in the “plain meaning” school of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, modern textualists do not believe that it is possible to infer meaning from 
“within the four corners” of a statute. Rather, they assert that language is intelligible only by 
virtue of a community’s shared conventions for understanding words in context. While rejecting 
the idea of subjective legislative intent, they contend that the effective communication of 
legislative commands is in fact possible because one can attribute to legislators the minimum 
intention “to say what one would be normally understood as saying, given the circumstances in 
which one said it.” 
Id. (citations omitted).  
 119 Id.  
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West Virginia University Hospital Inc., v. Casey provides a good 
illustration of the comparative textualist approach.120 In Casey, the Supreme 
Court had to decide whether 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which allowed a successful 
plaintiff to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees, also allowed a successful 
plaintiff to recover expert witness fees.121 At the time,122 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
allowed the prevailing party to recover “reasonable attorney’s fee[s] as part of 
the costs,” but the statute did not state whether the prevailing party could also 
recover his or her expert witness fees.123  
Justice Scalia looked to the statutory usage of attorneys’ fees and expert 
witnesses in similar statutes,124 and he noted that other statutes explicitly listed 
attorneys’ fees and expert witness fees as separate elements when discussing 
litigation costs.125 Thus, because 42 U.S.C. § 1988 failed to explicitly list 
“expert fees,” the Court held that the plaintiff could not recover expert fees 
because the statute’s language only listed “attorneys’ fees.”126 
A comparative textualist approach would seek to clarify the two potentially 
ambiguous aspects of § 362(k)(1): 1) whether the “including attorneys’ fees” 
language of the statute includes attorneys’ fees incurred while seeking 
damages; and 2) whether actual damages includes attorneys’ fees that an 
individual incurs while seeking damages. Comparing § 362(k)(1) to the text of 
similar bankruptcy statutes would provide insight. The ultimate goal of the 
comparison is to examine how explicit Congress has been when it allows an 
individual to recover attorneys’ fees for a damages proceeding and to 
determine how other statutes relate actual damages to attorneys’ fees. 
One similar statute is § 110(i)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 110 
details the penalties for persons who negligently or fraudulently prepare 
bankruptcy petitions on behalf of debtors.127 Section 110(i)(1) lists the possible 
 
 120 See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).  
 121 Id. at 84.  
 122 See id. at 85 n.1. Congress later amended the statute to explicitly include expert fees at a court’s 
discretion. See id. at 88. 
 123 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). 
 124 Id. at 88.  
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 92. 
 127 See 11 U.S.C. § 110(i)(1) (2006). In relevant part, § 110(i) provides the following: 
If a bankruptcy petition preparer violates this section . . . the court shall order the bankruptcy 
petition preparer to pay to the debtor— 
(A) the debtor’s actual damages; 
(B) the greater of— 
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penalties a fraudulent bankruptcy petition preparer has to pay the debtor.128 
The text of § 110(i)(1) lists actual damages and attorneys’ fees in independent 
subsections.129 Unlike the text in § 362(k)(1), the text of § 110(i)(1) 
specifically indicates that the debtor’s recoverable attorneys’ fees includes 
attorneys’ fees associated with “moving for damages under this subsection.”130 
This distinction is important because it shows that when Congress wants to 
allow a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees for a damages action, it explicitly 
states that proposition. Also, because the statute lists “actual damages” 
independently from attorneys’ fees “for damages under this subsection,” it 
indicates that actual damages normally do not encompass attorneys’ fees. 
Section 111(g)(2) of the Code makes a similar distinction. Section 111 of 
the Code lists the procedures to which nonprofit budget and credit counseling 
agencies must adhere to.131 In § 111(g)(2), Congress lists the damages that a 
debtor can recover if an agency willfully or negligently fails to comply with 
the statutory requirements.132 Congress lists actual damages and attorneys’ fees 
as separate damages a debtor can recover.133 Once again, Congress expressly 
stated that the debtor’s recoverable attorneys’ fees include “reasonable 
attorneys’ fees (as determined by the court) incurred in an action to recover 
those [actual] damages.”134 Here, the statute again explicitly states that 
attorneys’ fees include those incurred specifically in a damages proceeding. 
 
(i) $2,000; or 
(ii) twice the amount paid by the debtor to the bankruptcy petition preparer for the preparer’s 
services; and 
(C) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in moving for damages under this subsection. 
 128 See id. § 110(i)(1).  
 129 Id. 
 130 See id.  
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. § 111(g)(2). Section 111(g)(2) provides the following: 
A nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency that willfully or negligently fails to comply with 
any requirement under this title with respect to a debtor shall be liable for damages in an amount 
equal to the sum of— 
(A) any actual damages sustained by the debtor as a result of the violation; and 
(B) any court costs or reasonable attorneys’ fees (as determined by the court) incurred in an 
action to recover those damages. Id. 
 133 Id. § 111(g)(2).  
 134 See id. § 111(g)(2). Also note that Congress added § 111(g)(2) in 2005, the same year that Congress 
re-designated §362(k)(2). Thus, Congress did not include similar language in 362(k)(1) to explicitly include 
attorneys’ fees in a damages suit. See id. §§ 111(g)(2), 362(k)(1). 
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Section 526 of the Code makes a similar distinction. Section 526 of the 
Code lists restrictions on debt relief agencies.135 Section 526(c)(3) allows a 
State official to do the following: 
[B]ring an action on behalf of its residents to recover the actual 
damages of assisted persons arising from such violation . . .[and] in 
the case of any successful action under subparagraph (A) or (B), shall 
be awarded the costs of the action and reasonable attorneys’ fees as 
determined by the court.136 
Once again, the statute explicitly allows recovery of attorneys’ fees for a 
successful damages action. 
After comparing the text of § 362(k)(1) to other statutes, ambiguity still 
remains. When other similar statutes reference attorneys’ fees, they explicitly 
indicate that the attorneys’ fees were for the specific damages proceeding. On 
the other hand, § 362(k)(1) does not specifically express that the recoverable 
attorneys’ fees include those incurred in the damages proceeding. However, 
§ 362(k)(1) is different from the similar bankruptcy statutes listed because 
§ 362(k)(1) contains “actual damages” and “attorneys’ fees” in the same 
subsection, while the other statutes have different subsections separated for 
“actual damages” and “attorneys’ fees.” Thus, although in similar statutes 
Congress specifically expressed that attorneys’ fees would include attorneys’ 
fees incurred to seek damages, a strong argument can be made that by 
including actual damages in the same subsection as attorneys’ fees in 
§ 362(k)(1), Congress expected the same treatment of § 362(k)(1).  
3. Textual Canons of Construction 
Textualists also use canons of construction when engaging in statutory 
interpretation.137 A judicial canon is a rule of thumb that judges utilize when 
 
 135 Id. § 526(c)(3). Section 526(c)(3) provides: 
In addition to such other remedies as are provided under State law, whenever the chief law 
enforcement officer of a State, or an official or agency designated by a State, has reason to 
believe that any person has violated or is violating this section, the State— 
(A) may bring an action to enjoin such violation; 
(B) may bring an action on behalf of its residents to recover the actual damages of assisted 
persons arising from such violation, including any liability under paragraph (2); and 
(C) in the case of any successful action under subparagraph (A) or (B), shall be awarded the 
costs of the action and reasonable attorneys’ fees as determined by the court. 
 136 Id. § 526(c)(3)(B)–(C).  
 137 Manning, supra note 104, at 82. 
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interpreting legislation.138 Canons can be either semantic or substantive. 
Semantic canons are tools that courts use to better understand the language of a 
statute.139 Examples of semantic canons include expressio unius, noscitur a 
sociis, or ejusdem generis.140 Substantive canons are broader legal principles 
that judges keep in mind when interpreting legislation.141 Examples of 
substantive canons include the canon of constitutional avoidance, the 
federalism canon, and the rule of lenity.142 
When interpreting § 362(k)(1), the semantic canons of noscitur a sociis and 
the rule against superfluities are relevant. The canon of noscitur a sociis posits 
that a word’s meaning can be clarified and often narrowed by the words around 
it.143 The rule against superfluities guides judges to construe words in a way to 
not render other statutory terms superfluous.144 Section 362(k)(1) allows a 
debtor to “recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees . . . .”145 
By including court costs in the statute, Congress shed light on the meaning of 
the two terms around it: actual damages and attorneys’ fees.146 Because court 
costs relate to the damages proceeding, courts should also read attorneys’ fees 
to relate to the damages proceeding. Since “costs” and “attorneys’ fees” are 
listed side-by-side in § 362(k)(1) it would not make sense for the statute to 
allow a debtor to recover court costs for the damages proceeding but not 
attorneys’ fees for the same damages proceeding. By including “costs,” 
Congress shows that it was anticipating that the debtor’s actual damages would 
encompass his or her § 362(k)(1) court proceeding costs.147 Thus, the judicial 
cannon of noscitur a sociis provides additional support that Congress intended 
for § 362(k)(1) to include attorneys’ fees incurred in the damages proceeding. 
 
 138 CBS, Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1225 (11th Cir. 2001).  
 139 See id. (describing “canons of construction”); David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive 
Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 959. 
 140 Marcus, supra note 139, at 969.  
 141 John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 95–97 (2001) 
(discussing the Marshall Court’s approach and application of canons). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995).  
 144 Gluck, supra note 95, at 1763 n.37.  
 145 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006). 
 146 Dan Schechter, Debtor May Recover Attorney’s Fees Incurred During Prosecution of Creditor for 
Violation of Automatic Stay. COM. FIN. NEWS, Nov. 2010, at 95. 
 147 Id. 
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B. The Purposivist Approach 
The purposivist approach is another method of statutory interpretation, and 
it is often at odds with textualism.148 Under a purposivist approach, the pivotal 
consideration is the overall goal and purpose of the statute.149 Although the text 
is still important, purposivists believe that courts should interpret a statute’s 
text relative to the overall goal and purpose of the statute.150  Traditionally, the 
Supreme Court assigned highest priority to a statue’s purpose.151 For a long 
time, “the Supreme Court held that the ‘letter’ (text) of a statute must yield to 
its ‘spirit’ (purpose) when the two conflicted.”152 From the purposivist 
perspective, courts must act as faithful agents of Congress.153 Thus, the 
application of a statute must conform to Congress’s purpose for enacting the 
legislation. If a textual interpretation of a statute does not properly align with 
Congress’s overall purpose, courts must favor Congress’s purpose in creating 
the statute.154 To determine Congress’s purpose, courts pay close attention to a 
statute’s legislative history, including committee reports, Senate reports, House 
Reports, floor debates, and amendments to a statute.155 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of 
Massachusetts provides a good illustration of how courts apply a purposivist 
approach to bankruptcy law.156 In Marrama, the bankruptcy court dismissed 
the debtor’s chapter 13 case because prior to filing, the debtor fraudulently 
misrepresented the value of his assets.157 Despite his prepetition 
misrepresentations, the debtor sought to convert his chapter 13 case to a 
chapter 7.158 In support of the conversion, the debtor relied on § 706(a), which 
he argued guarantees a debtor an absolute right to convert the case.159 The 
 
 148 Gluck, supra note 95, at 1762. 
 149 Manning, supra note 104, at 86. 
 150 Waldron & Berman, supra note 105, at 203.  
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. (quoting Manning, supra note 141, at 71).  
 153 Manning, supra note 104, at 72.  
 154 Id. at 93. 
 155 See Gluck, supra note 95, at 1763; Elizabeth A. McNellie, Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the 
Interpretation of Popularly Enacted Legislation, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 161 (1989). 
 156 See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007). 
 157 Id.  
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. In whole, § 706(a) provides the following: 
(a) The debtor may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this 
title at any time, if the case has not been converted under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title. 
Any waiver of the right to convert a case under this subsection is unenforceable. 
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debtor reasoned that the text of § 706(a) gave him an absolute right to 
conversion, irrespective of any pre-petition misrepresentations.160  
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court held that 
§ 706(a) allows a court to reject a debtor’s conversion if the debtor did not act 
in good faith.161 This holding is based not on the statute’s text, but its purpose. 
As the dissent noted, nothing in the text of § 706 makes any reference to a 
good faith requirement.162 Instead, § 706 specifically lists only two exceptions: 
the conversion is barred under §§ 1112, 1208, or 1307; or the debtor seeking 
conversion does not qualify under the new chapter.163 The text of § 706(a) does 
not articulate a good faith exception.164 
Rather than confining its holding to the two exceptions expressly 
enumerated in § 706, the Court noted the overall purpose of the Code: to 
provide a fresh start to honest, but unfortunate debtors.165 To determine this 
purpose, the Court considered the legislative history of § 706.166 The Court 
examined the House and Senate Committee Reports, in which congressional 
members stated that § 706(a) must provide “the debtor the one-time absolute 
right of conversion of a liquidation case to a reorganization or individual 
repayment plan case.”167 Although members of Congress used the term 
“absolute right” in both reports, the Court noted that the term was not as clear 
as the debtor suggested.168 
The Court read in a good faith requirement based on the overall purpose 
evidenced in other parts of the Code.169 The Court relied on § 1307(c), which 
allows a court to dismiss or reconvert a debtor’s case “for cause.”170 Although 
the text of § 1307(c) does not include “bad-faith conduct” performed 
prepetition, the Court still used the statute to reject the debtor’s chapter 13 
 
11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (2006). 
 160 Marrama, 549 U.S. at 371.  
 161 Id. at 375.  
 162 Id. at 377 (“Nothing in § 706(a) or any other provision of the Code suggests that a bankruptcy judge 
has the discretion to override a debtor’s exercise of the conversion right on a ground not set out in the Code.”).  
 163 11 U.S.C. §706(a). 
 164 See id. 
 165 Marrama, 549 U.S. at 381.  
 166 Id. at 371.  
 167 Id. at 371 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5880; H.R. 
REP. NO. 95-595, at 380 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6336).  
 168 Id. at 372.  
 169 Id. at 374; see also Waldron & Berman, supra note 105, at 205.  
 170 Marrama, 549 U.S. at 373. 
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conversion.171 Rather than confining itself to the words of the statute in 
question, the Court considered the general policy goals of the Code to prevent 
what it perceived as an injustice.172 The Court held that the debtor fell outside 
of the Code’s purpose to protect “honest but unfortunate debtor[s].”173 
1. Under a Purposivist Approach, § 362(k)(1) Supports a Full Shift in a 
Debtor’s Attorneys’ Fees 
Under a purposivist approach, § 362(k)(1) supports an interpretation 
allowing a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees for remedying and prosecuting a 
creditor who violates the automatic stay. It is important to note, however, that 
there is no direct legislative history addressing § 362(k)(1).174 As the Northern 
District Court of Ohio stated, § 362(k)(1) “is indisputably an ambiguous statute 
with a dearth of legislative history.”175 Thus, to understand the purpose of 
§ 362(k)(1), it is important to consider the legislative history of the automatic 
stay, the historical significance surrounding the enactment of § 362(k)(1), 
principles of legislative acquiescence, and the statute itself.  
a. Finding the Purpose of § 362(k)(1) Through the Legislative History of 
the Automatic Stay 
Congress has placed great significance on the automatic stay. In the 
statute’s legislative history, Congress described the automatic stay as “one of 
the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.”176 
Specifically, Congress stated the following: 
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor 
protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the 
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all 
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. 
It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization 
 
 171 Id. at 374. 
 172 Id.  
 173 Id. 
 174 United States v. Harchar, 331 B.R. 720, 732 (N.D. Ohio 2005).  
 175 Id. Here, the court was referring to what was then codified as § 362(h). See supra text accompanying 
notes 43–48 (discussing the amendment of § 362, which made former § 362(h) present § 362(k).  
 176 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 54 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840–41; H.R. REP. NO. 95-
595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296. 
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plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that 
drove him into bankruptcy.177 
Further, Congress described an individual who seeks bankruptcy relief as 
“an individual who is in desperate trouble.”178 Congress stated the following: 
The consumer who seeks the relief of a bankruptcy court is an 
individual who is in desperate trouble . . . The short term future that 
he faces can literally destroy the basic integrity of his household. We 
believe that this individual is entitled to a focused and compassionate 
effort on the part of the legal system to alleviate otherwise 
insurmountable social and economic problems. We believe that relief 
should be provided with fairness to all concerned but with due regard 
to the dignity of the consumer as an individual who is in need of 
help.179 
Congress’s strong rhetoric in favor of the automatic stay shows the importance 
of the stay and, presumably, its enforcement. However, the automatic stay has 
not always been automatic, and sanctions against stay violators have not 
always been based on § 362(k)(1).180 
b. Finding the Purpose of § 362(k)(1) Through Analyzing the Historical 
Context of its Enactment 
To understand the purpose of § 362(k)(1), it is important to understand the 
historical context of its enactment. After examining the history of the 
automatic stay and § 362(k)(1), it becomes clear that Congress intended for 
§ 362(k)(1) to allow a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees for a damages action. 
Before the passage of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, the automatic stay, 
which was then known as the stay of collections, was instituted by court order 
and not by statute.181 Because the stay was imposed only through court order, 
creditors who violated the stay were punished solely through contempt of court 
 
 177 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 54 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840–41; H.R. REP. NO. 95-
595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296.  
 178 Wingard v. Altoona Reg’l Health Sys. (In re Wingard), 382 B.R. 892, 903–04 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 
2008) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 173 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6134). 
 179 In re Wingard, 382 B.R. at 903–04 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 173 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6134). 
 180 See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 181 Harchar, 331 B.R. at 729.  
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powers.182 After Congress made the stay statutory and automatic by passing 
§ 362 in 1978, courts continued to issue contempt of court sanctions against 
creditors who violated the automatic stay statute.183 Parties criticized the 
sanctioning process.184 They wondered how a court could hold a creditor in 
contempt of court for violating a statute rather than a court order.185 
Responding to this criticism, in 1984, Congress enacted what is now 
§ 362(k)(1) to serve as a statutory method to sanction creditors who violated 
the statutory automatic stay.186 The historical context surrounding § 362(k)(1) 
indicates that Congress passed it to replace the previous contempt of court 
sanctions imposed against stay violators. As such, one way to gain insight into 
whether Congress intended § 362(k)(1) to include attorneys’ fees incurred for 
the damages action is to consider whether attorneys’ fees were shifted under 
the contempt of court sanctions prior to 1984. 
Prior to 1984, bankruptcy courts allowed debtors to recover attorneys’ fees 
for a creditor’s violation of the automatic stay.187 In 1983, one year before 
Congress passed § 362(k)(1), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth 
Circuit decided on the issue of attorneys’ fees for an automatic stay violation in 
In re Zartun.188 In In re Zartun, the creditor violated the automatic stay by 
repossessing the debtor’s propane tank.189 A month after the repossession, the 
debtor initiated a proceeding against the creditor for violation of the automatic 
stay.190 Because Congress had yet to pass § 362(k)(1), the debtor had to assert 
that the creditor was in contempt of court for violating § 362(a). The debtor 
sought an order for return of the property and attorneys’ fees.191 Although the 
creditor argued that the award of attorneys’ fees violated the American Rule, 
the Panel affirmed the debtor’s award of $230 in damages and $1,095 in 
 
 182 See Jeffrey A. Stoops, Monetary Awards to the Debtor for Violations of the Automatic Stay, 11 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 423, 428 (1983).  
 183 Harchar, 331 B.R. at 729. 
 184 Id. at 730 (citing Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.1976)). 
 185 Id.  
 186 Id.  
 187 See Superior Propane v. Zartun (In re Zartun), 30 B.R. 543, 546 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983); see also 
Stoops, supra note 182, at 444 (noting that “in addition to providing compensation to the debtor, the 
bankruptcy courts are very liberal in awarding costs and attorney’s fees”).  
 188 In re Zartun, 30 B.R. at 546.  
 189 Id. at 545.  
 190 Id. at 543. 
 191 Id. at 545.  
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attorneys’ fees.192 The Panel reasoned that because the debtor needed his 
attorney to prove the stay violation, the award of attorneys’ fees was required 
to place the debtor in the position he was in prior to the stay violation.193 The 
panel stated the following: 
We fully accept [the debtor’s] contention, that the American Rule 
requires specific statutory or contractual authority for the award of 
attorneys [sic] fees. As indicated, the award of fees here can be 
justified on the basis of restoring the status that existed before the 
violation.194 
This case shows that courts allowed a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees 
incurred for the sanctions proceeding prior to the enactment of § 362(k)(1).195 
Although the fee-shifting went against the American Rule, courts found it 
necessary to restore the debtor to his or her status that existed before the stay 
violation.196 Then, in 1984, Congress enacted § 362(k)(1) simply to replace the 
contempt of court method with a statutory method.197 As such, it only makes 
sense that Congress’s purpose for enacting § 362(k)(1), the statutory 
replacement to the contempt of court method, was for the fee shifting methods 
that courts used to carry on. Therefore, given the historical context surrounding 
the passage of § 362(k)(1), one can infer that Congress intended § 362(k)(1) to 
allow a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees for the damages proceeding. In this 
way, the debtor would be made whole again. 
2. Legislative Acquiescence 
The doctrine of legislative acquiescence posits that congressional intent can 
be shown by Congress’s response to judicial decisions.198 For example, 
Congress will convey its satisfaction with judicial decisions on a particular 
statute by choosing not to reform the statute. On the other hand, if Congress 
opposes the court’s interpretation of a statute, Congress can simply rewrite the 
statute so that it conforms to Congress’s intent. 
 
 192 Id. at 546. Instead of requiring the creditor return the propane tank, the court enforced compensatory 
damages because the debtor obtained a new tank prior to the judgment. Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 See id.; Caw v. Seward (In re Caw), 16 B.R. 631, 633–34 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981); Stoops, supra note 
182, at 444.  
 196 In re Zartun, 30 B.R. at 546.  
 197 United States v. Harchar, 331 B.R. 720, 730 (N.D. Ohio 2005).  
 198 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 67 (1988).  
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With regard to § 362(k)(1), Congress expressed legislative acquiescence 
with the court’s decision to include attorneys’ fees for prosecuting a damages 
claim.199 Soon after Congress passed § 362(k)(1) in 1984, courts began 
interpreting it to allow debtors to recover attorneys’ fees in both circumstances: 
1) attorneys’ fees incurred to stop the automatic stay violation; and 2) 
attorneys’ fees incurred to seek damages against the automatic stay violator.200 
By 2004, bankruptcy courts and district courts were in overwhelming 
agreement that Congress intended § 362(k)(1) to allow for the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees in both scenarios.201 Then, in 2005, when Congress made 
substantial changes to the Code, Congress chose not to disturb the language of 
the statute.202 Although Congress renumbered the provision to its current 
location, Congress did not to alter the language of § 362(k)(1).203 Thus, under 
the legislative acquiescence theory, Congress accepted the consensus of the 
courts that allowed awarding attorneys’ fees to fix the stay violation and to 
seek damages against the violator. 
There are numerous cases prior to 2005 holding that § 362(k)(1) guarantees 
a debtor his or her full amount of attorneys’ fees. In 1987, the bankruptcy court 
for the District of New Hampshire held that § 362(k)(1) allowed a debtor to 
recover attorneys’ fees to remedy the stay violation and to seek damages 
against the stay violator.204 In In re Joslyn, the court stated the following: “The 
whole point of the § 362(h)205 provision is to discourage violations of the 
automatic stay by appropriate sanctions—and litigation to determine and 
enforce the sanctions is necessarily implied.”206 Also, in 2002, the Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit held that § 362(k)(1) allowed a debtor to 
recover attorneys’ fees for the damages action.207 In In re Roman, the court 
stated, “§ 362(h) is a statutory exception to the American Rule and it allows 
 
 199 See Grine v. Chambers (In re Grine), 439 B.R. 461, 470 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (noting that 
Congress had an opportunity to alter §362(k)(1) in 2005, but it chose not to do so).  
 200 See Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 159 B.R. 890, 900 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (noting that “it is well 
established that the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in prosecuting an adversary proceeding seeking damages 
arising from a violation of the automatic stay is recoverable”); Joslyn v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re 
Joslyn), 75 B.R. 590, 593 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987).  
 201 See In re Grine, 439 B.R. at 470 (noting that prior to BAPCPA, there was substantial precedent 
allowing a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees for both remedying and prosecuting a claim under then § 362(h)).  
 202 See id. (discussing how Congress left the wording of §362(k)(1) the same after renumbering the statute 
and many other bankruptcy provisions).  
 203 See id.  
 204 In re Joslyn, 75 B.R. at 593.  
 205 § 362(k)(1) was designated as § 362(h) prior to 2005. See supra text accompanying notes 43–48. 
 206 In re Joslyn, 75 B.R. at 593.  
 207 Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. Roman, (In re Roman), 283 B.R. 1, 9–10 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002).  
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attorneys’ fees to be “actual damages,” rather than a separate litigation 
expense.”208 Notably, In re Roman and Sternberg v. Johnston209 are both Ninth 
Circuit cases. Thus, prior to the Sternberg holding, courts within its circuit 
were in agreement that § 362(k)(1) allowed a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees 
in both instances.210 
After courts consistently interpreted § 362(k)(1) as a fee-shifting statute for 
almost twenty years, Congress declined to amend the statute. Instead, in 2005, 
Congress renumbered it, but left the wording the same. This behavior 
illustrates that Congress acquiesced with the judiciary in its interpretation of 
the statute. Thus, the legislative acquiescence theory supports interpreting 
§ 362(k)(1) to include attorneys’ fees included in stopping the stay violation 
and in seeking damages against the stay violator. 
C. The Textualist Versus Purposivist Debate 
Although many assume that a textual and a purposivist approach are always 
in conflict, courts often combine both approaches when interpreting statutes.211 
Relying solely on the text of a statute, while ignoring the context of the statute, 
can create problems; further, relying solely on the purpose of a statute, while 
minimizing the text of the statute, can also create problems. Thus, a synthesis 
of both methods is the best approach. 
When interpreting bankruptcy statutes, the Supreme Court has traditionally 
focused heavily on the text of the statute.212 Initially, the Court applies a plain 
meaning approach, but it will consider other indicia of Congressional intent if 
there is ambiguity in the text of the statute.213 
A textualist approach does not always yield good outcomes if Congress’s 
purpose is clearly contrary to a textualist reading. In such a situation, a 
textualist interpretation will usually result in Congress reversing the court’s 
interpretation through enacting a legislative amendment. For example, in West 
Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, the Court took a textualist 
 
 208 Id. at 10.  
 209 See supra Part I.C.1. 
 210 See In re Roman, 283 B.R. at 10.  
 211 Manning, supra note 104, at, 78 (noting that “the distinction between textualism and purposivism is 
not, as is often assumed, cut-and-dried”).  
 212 Lee Dembart & Bruce A. Markell, Alive at 25? A Short Review of the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy 
Jurisprudence, 1979–2004, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373, 386 (2004).  
 213 Id.  
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approach, even though the statute’s overall purpose conflicted with a textualist 
interpretation of the statute.214 A year after the Casey opinion, Congress 
abrogated the Court’s decision by amending the statute. Thus, through 
Congress’ subsequent amendment, it indicated that it intended something 
different than the textual gymnastics that Justice Scalia used in Casey. 
With regards to § 362(k)(1), it seems clear that Congress enacted the statute 
for the purpose of returning a debtor to his or her financial position but for the 
stay violation.215 Under a textualist approach, § 362(k)(1) seems to allow a 
debtor to recover attorneys’ fees for the damages proceeding. Although the text 
of § 362(k)(1) has some ambiguities, those ambiguities are not enough to 
defeat the clear purpose of the statute. When the purpose of a statute is clear, 
but the text is a bit less clear, it is appropriate to interpret a statute based upon 
its overall purpose.216 
III.  THERE ARE COMPELLING POLICY REASONS TO INTERPRET § 362(K)(1) 
AS A FULL FEE-SHIFTING STATUTE 
Because of the meager financial position of the bankruptcy petitioner, 
courts should read § 362(k)(1) to allow for the recovery of attorneys’ fees 
incurred in the damages proceeding. There are compelling policy reasons to 
allow such a recovery. First, there can be significant financial differences in 
attorneys’ fees associated with stopping the stay violation versus seeking 
damages. Second, because courts are inconsistent in awarding punitive 
damages and emotional distress damages, forcing a debtor to pay his or her 
own attorneys’ fees may discourage debtors from enforcing the automatic stay, 
which is a cornerstone of bankruptcy. Third, Congress and the courts have 
made exceptions to the American Rule on similar occasions to deter 
unscrupulous conduct by creditors. 
A. The Cost Differential 
To recover damages under § 362(k)(1), a debtor must either file a motion or 
initiate an adversary proceeding against the stay violator.217 Regardless of 
 
 214 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 215 See id. 
 216 Cf. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 372–74 (2007). 
 217 Most courts hold that the debtor must bring a § 362(k)(1) claim as an adversary proceeding subject to 
Rule 7001. Nancy C. Dreher, The Automatic Stay: Consequences Of Violating The Stay, in BANKRUPTCY LAW 
MANUAL § 7:57 (5th ed. 2011). However, a few courts have held that the debtor only has to file a motion. See 
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which is required, either proceeding requires a debtor to incur substantial costs 
and attorneys’ fees.218 On the other hand, the monetary loss that the debtor 
suffers as a result of the stay violation is often small or nominal.219 
For example, assume that a creditor violates the automatic stay by 
repossessing a debtor’s vehicle. Two days later, however, after the debtor’s 
attorney notifies the creditor that its actions are unlawful, the creditor returns 
the debtor’s vehicle. During the two days that the debtor’s car was repossessed, 
the debtor had to miss one day of work because of the automatic stay violation. 
As a result of losing one day’s income, the debtor lost $125. If the debtor 
wants to pursue his rights against the creditor, the debtor’s attorney would have 
to file an adversary proceeding.220 The adversary proceeding would require the 
attorney to expend time writing a complaint, attending hearings, and preparing 
for trial. At the conclusion of the process, the debtor’s attorneys’ fees for 
seeking damages could be as high as $10,000.221 Thus, for a $125 loss, the 
debtor could potentially accumulate up to $10,000 in attorneys’ fees because 
the creditor willfully violated the automatic stay. These large cost 
discrepancies between actual damages and the attorneys’ fees incurred for 
recovering the actual damages represent the norm in § 362(k)(1) actions.222 
In re Henderson illustrates an example of a debtor facing large 
discrepancies between actual damages and attorneys’ fees incurred to recover 
those actual damages.223 In In re Henderson, a creditor, on two occasions, 
 
Williams v. Levi (In re Williams), 323 B.R. 691, 702 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005); In re Hildreth, 362 B.R. 523, 526 
(Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2007).  
 218 See Sternberg v. Johnston, 595 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2010) (debtor incurred $69,986 in adversary 
proceeding to recover damages from an automatic stay violation).  
 219 See, e.g., Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. Roman, (In re Roman), 283 B.R. 1, 9 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002) 
(describing a debtor who filed a motion against a stay violator even though the debtor only suffered $5 in 
actual damages).  
 220 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.  
 221 At a standard rate of $250 per hour, a debtor can incur roughly $10,000 in attorney’s fees after the 
attorney expends forty hours during the litigation to recover damages. The amount of time an attorney may 
spend on an adversary proceeding can vary greatly. For example, in In re Grine, the debtor’s attorney incurred 
only $560 worth of expenses. Grine v. Chambers (In re Grine), 439 B.R. 461, 474 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010). 
However, in In re Henderson, the debtor’s attorney incurred fees of $40,047 for the same type of proceeding. 
Henderson v. Auto Barn Atlanta, Inc. (In re Henderson), No. 09-50596, 2011 WL 1838777, at *9 (Bankr. E.D. 
Ky. May 13, 2011).  
 222 E.g., Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. Roman, (In re Roman), 283 B.R. 1, 9–10 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002) 
(upholding an award of $1,000 in attorney’s fees after the debtor suffered $5 in actual damages); Bertuccio v. 
Cal. State Contractors License Bd. (In re Bertuccio), No. 04-56255, 2009 WL 3380605, at *7 & n.7 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2009) (holding that the debtor could only recover $4,084 of attorneys’ fees because the 
remaining balance of $28,177 was incurred to prosecute the creditor under § 362(k)(1)). 
 223 See In re Henderson, 2011 WL 1838777. 
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repossessed the debtor’s vehicle after the debtor filed for chapter 13 relief.224 
As a result, the debtor’s attorney had to remedy the situation to have the 
debtor’s vehicle returned.225 Also, the creditor left malicious messages on the 
debtor’s voicemail.226 For example, the creditor left the debtor a message 
stating “you are a very bad person” and “you will be put in jail.”227 In 
response, the debtor filed an adversary proceeding against the creditor under 
§ 362(k)(1), seeking punitive and actual damages. As a result of the creditor’s 
repossession, however, the debtor’s monetary losses only totaled $250 in lost 
wages.228 In comparison, at the conclusion of the adversary proceeding, the 
debtor accumulated $40,047.50 in attorneys’ fees.229 Most of the attorneys’ 
fees were incurred for seeking damages against the creditor. The court awarded 
the debtor $40,047.50 in attorneys’ fees, which included fees incurred during 
the adversary proceeding.230 Also, the court awarded the debtor $25,000 in 
punitive damages.231 
The Henderson court got it right. Even though the debtor’s monetary losses 
totaled only $250, courts should still enable debtors to utilize their rights under 
§ 362(k)(1) against such egregious behavior by creditors. Otherwise, automatic 
stay violations could go unpunished. For example, if the Henderson court had 
taken the Sternberg approach, Mr. Henderson would have recovered $250 in 
actual damages, but he would have had to pay out of his own pocket 
$40,047.50 in attorneys’ fees to recover his very minimal lost wages. These 
numbers do not seem fair. Does a bankrupt person really have recourse against 
an automatic stay violator if the debtor has to personally incur $40,000 in 
attorney’s fees to get back $250 in lost wages? A cash-strapped debtor should 
not have to face this difficult decision when considering whether to vindicate 
the rights that Congress provides under the automatic stay. Instead, if creditors 
willfully violate the stay, courts should hold creditors liable for the attorneys’ 
fees that a debtor incurs for the damages proceeding. 
In re Ventura-Linenko represents another case where a debtor’s attorney 
fees for fixing versus prosecuting a § 362(k)(1) action are grossly 
 
 224 Id. at *5.  
 225 Id. at *1.  
 226 Id.  
 227 Id. at *7.  
 228 Id. at *3.  
 229 Id. at *7.  
 230 Id. at *9.  
 231 Id.  
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disproportionate.232 In In re Ventura-Linenko, the debtor filed for chapter 13 in 
April of 2009.233 Prior to the bankruptcy filing, the debtor was facing 
foreclosure actions from her creditor.234 Just seven days prior to her 
bankruptcy filing, the debtor’s creditor filed eviction paperwork in state 
court.235 Thus, the debtor’s bankruptcy filing required the creditor to stay the 
eviction proceedings.236 However, the creditor violated the automatic stay on 
the following month when the creditor served the debtor with an eviction 
notice.237 
In an effort to stop the creditor’s stay violation, the debtor’s attorney sent 
the creditor a letter detailing that its eviction efforts were in violation of the 
automatic stay.238 Then, the creditor served the debtor with an Order to Show 
Cause.239 In response, the debtor’s attorney sent the creditor a second letter 
informing the creditor that the debtor would file a motion for sanctions for its 
willful violation of the stay.240 The debtor then went ahead and filed her 
§ 362(k)(1) motion for sanctions.241 Rather than ending the dispute there, the 
creditor decided to rebut the debtor’s claims with additional litigation.242 The 
creditor argued that its actions did not violate the stay, and it later filed a 
motion for relief from the automatic stay.243 After going back and forth with 
briefs, the bankruptcy court finally granted the debtor’s motion for sanctions 
almost a year after the creditor first violated the automatic stay.244 
Notably, the court refused to award the debtor attorneys’ fees incurred in 
pursuing the sanctions.245 Instead, the court only allowed the debtor to recover 
 
 232 See Page Ventures, LLC v. Ventura-Linenko (In re Ventura-Linenko), No. 3:10-cv-138-RCJ-RAM, 
2011 WL 1304464 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 2011). 
 233 Id. at *1. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. The creditor asked the state court for an order directing the debtor to show cause why she should 
not be removed from the property. Id. 
 236 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).  
 237 In re Ventura-Linenko, 2011 WL 1304464, at *1. 
 238 Id. at *2. The letter informed the creditor that the debtor would seek damages against the creditor if 
they continued forth with the eviction proceedings. Id. 
 239 Id.  
 240 Id. 
 241 Id.  
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. at *4–5. The bankruptcy court awarded the debtor $3,500 in emotional distress damages and $3,500 
in punitive damages. Id. at *4, *5. 
 245 Id. at *4. 
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attorneys’ fees incurred to “fix” the stay violation.246 Although the §362(k)(1) 
action had lingered on for nine months, the debtor could only recover for one 
hour of attorneys’ fees.247 The court limited the debtor’s recoverable attorneys’ 
fees to work performed to stop the creditor’s eviction proceedings.248 The 
debtor was not allowed to recover for any attorneys’ fees incurred between the 
date of fixing the stay violation and the court’s judgment.249 The one hour of 
attorneys’ fees included time for a telephone call concerning the eviction 
notice and writing two letters to the creditor to cease the eviction.250 In 
refusing to allow the debtor to recover attorneys’ fees for the § 362(k)(1) 
proceeding, the district court relied on the precedent in Sternberg v. 
Johnston.251 
Although the debtor’s attorney spent 26545 hours to stop the stay violation 
and to seek damages under § 362(k)(1), the court only allowed the debtor to 
recover for one hour of billable time.252 At a rate of $350 per hour, the 
discrepancy between the fees and the actual damages is great. The debtor only 
incurred $350 to fix the stay violation, but she incurred $8,907 to seek 
damages for the stay violation under § 362(k)(1).253 In this case, the debtor, 
who was already in a tumultuous financial position, suffered an overall 
financial loss after her creditor willfully violated the automatic stay. Cases like 
this rasises the following question: why should a debtor suffer a financial loss 
after a creditor is guilty of willfully disregarding one of the most fundamental 
aspects of the Code? Instead, courts should read § 362(k)(1) in a way that 
places the debtor back in the financial position he or she would have been in 
but for the creditor’s stay violation. 
B. Uncertainty of Winning Under § 362(k)(1) 
Debtors and their lawyers are already hesitant when deciding whether to 
prosecute stay violators because of the uncertainty of recovery.254 Thus, 
interpreting § 362(k)(1) to allow debtors to recover attorneys’ fees for the 
damages proceeding will decrease the hesitancy and encourage debtors to 
 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. at *9. 
 248 Id. at *4. 
 249 Id. at *9. 
 250 Id. at *4. 
 251 Id. at *9 (citing Sternberg v. Johnston, 595 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 252 Id. at *8–9 
 253 Id. at *8.  
 254 See Grine v. Chambers (In re Grine), 439 B.R. 461, 470–71 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010).  
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pursue their rights. Debtors are uncertain because of bankruptcy courts’ 
inconsistencies in awarding punitive damages and emotional distress damages. 
Under § 362(k)(1), punitive damages may be awarded.255 However, an 
award of punitive damages is completely within the court’s discretion.256 As 
such, courts are reluctant to award a debtor punitive damages under 
§ 362(k)(1).257 Courts will generally only award punitive damages under 
§ 362(k)(1) for “conduct that is egregious, vindictive or intentionally 
malicious, or when there is a strong showing that the creditor acted in bad faith 
or otherwise undertook their actions in reckless disregard of the law.”258 For 
example, the court awarded a debtor punitive damages in In re Westridge after 
the creditor shouted obscenities, demanded repayment, and grabbed the debtor 
at a 341 meeting.259 Clearly, punitive damages were warranted here. However, 
in less extreme cases, a court may deny a debtor’s request for punitive 
damages. Consequently, if no punitive damages mitigate the attorneys’ fees, 
the cash-strapped debtor will bear the cost of attorneys’ fees even though the 
creditor willfully violated the stay. 
Also, courts are split as to whether to award emotional distress damages 
under § 362(k)(1).260 Some courts allow them while others do not. Moreover, 
there is uncertainty as to whether a court will find a debtor’s emotional 
damages credible.261 This uncertainty can persuade cash-strapped debtors to 
opt against enforcing their rights because of the possibility of incurring 
substantial attorneys’ fees in the process. For example, the Seventh Circuit 
does not allow a debtor to recover emotional distress damages absent a 
“tangible” financial loss.262 In Aiello v. Providian Financial Corp., the Seventh 
Circuit denied the debtor an award of emotional distress damages after the 
 
 255 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006) (providing that an individual “in appropriate circumstances, may recover 
punitive damages”). 
 256 See Tyson v. Hunt (In re Tyson), 450 B.R. 754, 766 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2011).  
 257 Id. at 767 (noting that “courts are generally reluctant to award punitive damages under § 362(k)”).  
 258 Id. (quoting In re Bivens, 324 B.R. 39, 42–43 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 259 See In re Westridge, No. 07-35257, 2009 WL 3491164, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (awarding 
punitive damages after the creditor shouted obscenities, demanded repayment, and grabbed the debtor at a 341 
meeting).  
 260 See Dreher, supra note 217, § 7:57.  
 261 See In re Hedetneimi, 297 B.R. 837, 842 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) (requiring the debtor to produce 
medical evidence before awarding emotional distress damages); Diviney v. NationsBank, Inc. (In re Diviney), 
211 B.R. 951, 967 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1997) (denying a debtor’s § 362(k)(1) claim for emotional distress after 
the creditor used profanity against the debtor in heated conversations with the debtor).  
 262 See Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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debtor suffered tears and nausea after a creditor’s threat.263 The Aiello court 
reasoned that the automatic stay protects only against financial loss.264 Also, 
some courts require a debtor to produce expert evidence in order to recover 
emotional distress damages.265 
C. Congress Has Made Similar Exceptions to the American Rule 
Unlike most countries’ judicial systems, the United States’ judicial system 
generally requires that each party pay his or her own attorneys’ fees, win or 
lose.266 This has been the general policy in the United States since the late 
eighteenth century.267 There are important exceptions to the American Rule, 
however.268 When statutes indicate otherwise, like by including fee-shifting 
language, courts must disregard the American Rule and uphold the statute’s 
shifting language.269 
Congress has ordered that courts ignore the American Rule in similar 
instances to deter unscrupulous actions by creditors.270 For example, consider 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Congress passed the 
FDCPA to curb abusive debt collection methods by creditors.271 Under the 
FDCPA, Congress requires a creditor who violates the statute to pay a 
consumer’s reasonable attorneys’ fees in a damages proceeding.272 
 
 263 Id. at 881. 
 264 Id. 
 265 In re Hedetneimi, 297 B.R. at 842; In re Aiello, 231 B.R. at 691–92.  
 266 John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to 
Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1993).  
 267 Id. at 1575–78.  
 268 Id. at 1578–90. 
 269 Id. at 1587–89.  
 270 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a)(3); 1692k(a)(3) (2006).  
 271 Id. §1692(e). Congress stated the purpose of the FDCPA is: “It is the purpose of this subchapter to 
eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain 
from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent 
State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” Id.  
 272 Id. § 1692k(a) provides:  
any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any 
person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of—. . . (3) in the case of any 
successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court. On a finding by the court that an action 
under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may 
award to the defendant attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs. 
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Also, Congress has ordered that courts ignore the American Rule in the 
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”).273 The TILA requires that creditors make fair 
and honest disclosures to consumers who are seeking credit. If a creditor 
violates provisions of the TILA, Congress requires that the creditor pay the 
consumer’s reasonable attorneys’ fees in a damages proceeding.274 
Although Congress did not make the fee-shifting language as clear in 
§ 362(k)(1) as in the above examples, these statutes show that Congress has a 
general policy of allowing a debtor/consumer to recover reasonable attorneys’ 
fees after a creditor acts in an abusive manner. With regard to creditors who 
willfully violate the automatic stay, the same should apply. The goal in each of 
these statutory schemes is to protect consumers/debtors and deter abusive 
activities by creditors. 
Additionally, there is a persuasive textual argument that supports the 
assertion that Congress intended § 362(k)(1) to circumvent the American Rule. 
The Supreme Court has held that attorneys’ fees are not to be considered as 
“damages” unless Congress expresses otherwise.275 For example, in Summit 
Valley Industries, Inc. v. Carpenters, the Court held that § 303 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act did not circumvent the American Rule because 
Congress did not include the term “attorney’s fees” when referencing 
damages.276 Contrarily, in § 362(k)(1), Congress explicitly included the term 
“attorneys’ fees” when referencing damages.277 
Thus, even the language of § 362(k)(1) supports the assertion that Congress 
intended it to circumvent the American Rule. Because it is well understood that 
damages do not include attorneys’ fees, Congress included specific language to 
ensure that bankruptcy courts allow a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees under 
§ 362(k)(1).278 Because Congress took extra measures to ensure that the statute 
 
 273 See id. § 1640(a)(3). 
 274 Id.  
 275 Summit Valley Indus., Inc. v. Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 724 (1982). 
 276 Id. at 726.The statute provides:  
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason [of] or1any violation of 
subsection (a) of this section may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject to 
the limitations and provisions of section 185 of this title without respect to the amount in 
controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the 
damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit. 
29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (2006).  
 277 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006). 
 278 See id. 
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circumvents the American Rule, courts should not take a narrow reading of the 
term “actual damages.” 
D. Potential Solutions 
There are two ways to resolve the current circuit split regarding the reading 
of § 362(k)(1). First, the Supreme Court can decide the issue. Second, 
Congress can amend the statute to add clarity. 
1. Judicial Resolution 
The judiciary can solve the controversy surrounding § 362(k)(1). When 
circuit splits are created, the Supreme Court is in the best position to create 
uniformity across the federal judicial system. So far, two circuit courts of 
appeals have ruled on the attorneys’ fees issue regarding § 362(k)(1).279 The 
Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have issued diverging holdings on the 
issue.280 Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari on the issue in 2010,281 
the Court may decide to take up another case in the near future to resolve the 
circuit split. The Supreme Court should award certiorari on this issue because 
of the inconsistencies present among the federal courts and to allow debtors in 
Ninth Circuit courts the full protection against creditors who violate the 
automatic stay. 
If the Supreme Court does hear the issue, the Court should take a 
purposivist approach and allow a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees for fixing 
the violation and for seeking damages under § 362(k)(1). The automatic stay is 
of utmost significance in bankruptcy, and § 362(k)(1) is designed to protect 
debtors from a denial of protection under the automatic stay. 
2. Congressional Amendment 
Given the political structure of American government, Congress stands in 
the best position to add clarity to a controversial statute. Congress can amend 
§ 362(k)(1) to reflect its true intentions and resolve any ambiguity. From a 
textualist perspective, one of the main problems with § 362(k)(1) is that it does 
not expressly indicate that the debtor can recover attorneys’ fees for a damages 
 
 279 Compare Young v. Repine (In re Repine), 536 F.3d 512, 522 (5th Cir. 2008), with Sternberg v. 
Johnston, 595 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 280 See supra Part I.C. 
 281 Sternberg, 595 F.3d 937, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010).  
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action. This omission is noteworthy because other similar bankruptcy statutes 
do include such specific language.282 As such, Congress can increase clarity by 
enacting the following amendment: 
[A]n individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by 
this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and 
attorneys’ fees incurred for this action, and, in appropriate 
circumstances, may recover punitive damages. 
Another problem with the text of § 362(k)(1) is that it lacks some language 
that typically is present in most fee-shifting statutes.283 The crux of § 362(k)(1) 
allows an individual to recover actual damages and punitive damages. 
Although the statute lists “costs and attorneys’ fees,” they are only awarded as 
part of actual damages.284 Attaching attorneys’ fees to actual damages creates 
some confusion because, generally, a party’s actual damages do not include 
attorneys’ fees.285 Thus, one wonders whether the attorneys’ fees in 
§ 362(k)(1) include attorneys’ fees incurred after the willful stay violation 
ceases.286 Congress can clarify this issue by separating the attorneys’ fees 
language from the actual damages language. Congress can remove the 
attorneys’ fees language from § 362(k)(1), and add a separate fee-shifting 
provision in a newly added subsection: § 362(k)(3). As such, the two sections 
would read as follows: 
(1) [A]n individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided 
by this section shall recover actual damages, and, in appropriate 
circumstances, may recover punitive damages. . . . 
(3) An individual who brings forth a credible claim under paragraph 
(1) shall recover reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees. 
Wording the statute this way is a good solution because it gives courts 
discretion to deny a debtor attorneys’ fees for a seemingly frivolous damages 
proceeding. One of the motivations that the Sternberg court discussed in 
reaching its decision was the policy rationale to not encourage unnecessary 
litigation.287 Thus, by allowing a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees only for 
“credible claims,” courts can ensure that predacious attorneys are not trying to 
rack up fees for unnecessary reasons. Many courts, however, already require 
 
 282 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 283 See supra Part II.B.2.  
 284 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006).  
 285 Summit Valley Indus., Inc. v. Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 723 (1982).  
 286 See Sternberg, 595 F.3d at 947.  
 287 Id. at 948.  
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such a reasonableness test, so including such language in an amendment will 
add credence to these courts’ reasoning.288 
Between these two options, a congressional resolution or a judicial 
resolution, Congress is in the best position to resolve the controversy 
surrounding §362(k)(1). Currently, the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit that 
does not allow a debtor to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in the damages 
proceeding.289 Also, the Ninth Circuit was very firm in its holding and 
reasoning in Sternberg.290 Thus, because the Supreme Court has already denied 
certiorari on the issue, it is unlikely that a debtor would appeal the issue before 
the Ninth Circuit again. Therefore, the chances of an appeal from the Ninth 
Circuit to the Supreme Court are slim. Given this reality, Congress currently 
stands in the best position to resolve the fee-shifting issue surrounding 
§362(k)(1). Therefore, in order to protect the rights of debtors in the Ninth 
Circuit, Congress should enact an amendment to crystallize its true intentions. 
CONCLUSION 
After conducting a careful statutory interpretation analysis, it becomes clear 
that Congress intended bankruptcy courts to read § 362(k)(1) as a full fee-
shifting statute. Although the text of the statute has some ambiguities,291 the 
purpose of § 362(k)(1) and the automatic stay are clear. Congress intended that 
the automatic stay serve as one of the most fundamental protections in the 
bankruptcy process.292 Moreover, Congress passed § 362(k)(1) to ensure that 
creditors pay damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.293 To 
further the purpose of § 362(k)(1), courts must hold a willful stay violator 
responsible for the attorneys’ fees that a debtor incurs in seeking damages. 
Additionally, there are important policy reasons why courts should 
interpret § 362(k)(1) as a full fee-shifting statute. For one, because of the 
unique financial position of the debtor, bankruptcy courts should place the 
debtor in the position that he or she would have been in but for the stay 
violation. Also, the large discrepancy in attorneys’ fees incurred to fix versus 
 
 288 See Grine v. Chambers (In re Grine), 439 B.R. 461, 471 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010).  
 289 See id. at 469–71.  
 290 See Sternberg, 595 F.3d at 942–48.  
 291 See, e.g., id. at 947 (“‘actual damages’ is an ambiguous phrase.”). Also, § 362(k)(1) does not explicitly 
state that the recoverable attorneys’ fees are for those incurred in the damages proceeding.  
 292 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296. 
 293 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).  
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to prosecute the stay violator may discourage cash-strapped debtors from 
pursuing their legal rights.294 
These reasons support the proposition that the Ninth Circuit in Sternberg v. 
Johnston simply got it wrong. Sadly, however, courts in its jurisdiction are 
forced to limit a debtor’s recovery under § 362(k)(1) and indirectly the 
enforcement of the automatic stay. Hopefully, Congress will soon step in and 
resolve this current circuit split. 
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